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Fabiana Zollo and Walter Quattrociocchi
Abstract Social media are pervaded by unsubstantiated or untruthful rumors, that
contribute to the alarming phenomenon of misinformation. The widespread pres-
ence of a heterogeneous mass of information sources may affect the mechanisms
behind the formation of public opinion. Such a scenario is a florid environment for
digital wildfires when combined with functional illiteracy, information overload,
and confirmation bias. In this essay, we focus on a collection of works aiming at
providing quantitative evidence about the cognitive determinants behind misinfor-
mation and rumor spreading. We account for users’ behavior with respect to two
distinct narratives: a) conspiracy and b) scientific information sources. In particular,
we analyze Facebook data on a time span of five years in both the Italian and the US
context, and measure users’ response to i) information consistent with one’s narra-
tive, ii) troll contents, and iii) dissenting information e.g., debunking attempts. Our
findings suggest that users tend to a) join polarized communities sharing a common
narrative (echo chambers), b) acquire information confirming their beliefs (confir-
mation bias) even if containing false claims, and c) ignore dissenting information.
1 Introduction
The rapid advance of the Internet and web technologies facilitated global commu-
nications all over the world, allowing news and information to spread rapidly and
intensively. These changes led up to the formation of a new scenario, where people
actively participate in both contents’ production and diffusion, without the medi-
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ation of journalists or experts in the field. The emergence of such a wide, hetero-
geneous (and disintermediated) mass of information sources may affect contents’
quality and the mechanisms behind the formation of public opinion [32, 29, 49]. In-
deed, despite the enthusiastic rhetoric about collective intelligence [35], unsubstan-
tiated or untruthful rumors reverberate on social media, contributing to the alarming
phenomenon of misinformation. Since 2013, the World Economic Forum (WEF)
has been placing the global danger of massive digital misinformation at the core of
other technological and geopolitical risks, ranging from terrorism, to cyber attacks,
up to the failure of global governance [26]. People are misinformed when they hold
beliefs neglecting factual evidence, and misinformation may influence public opin-
ion negatively. Empirical investigations have showed that, in general, people tend
to resist facts, holding inaccurate factual beliefs confidently [31]. Moreover, correc-
tions frequently fail to reduce misperceptions [39] and often act as a backfire effect.
Thus, beyond its undoubted benefits, a hyperconnected world may allow the viral
spread of misleading information, which may have serious real-word consequences.
In that direction, examples are numerous. Inadequate health policies in South Africa
led to more than 300,000 unnecessary AIDS deaths [37], however the events were
exacerbated by AIDS denialists, who state that HIV is inoffensive and that antiretro-
viral drugs cause, rather than treat, AIDS. Similar considerations may be extended
to the Ebola outbreak in west Africa: after the death of two people having drunk
salt water, the World Health Organisation (WHO) had to restate that all rumours
about hypothetical cures or practices were false and that their use could be danger-
ous [14]. Or again, the American case of Jade Helm 15, a military training exercise
which took place in multiple US states, but turned out to be perceived as a conspir-
acy plot aiming at imposing martial law, to the extent that Texas Gov. Greg Abbott
ordered the State Guard to monitor the operations.
Certainly, such a scenario represents a florid environment for digital wildfires, es-
pecially when combined with functional illiteracy, information overload, and confir-
mation bias – i.e., the tendency to seek, select, and interpret information coherently
with one’s system of beliefs [38]. On the Internet people can access always more
extreme versions of their own opinions. In this way, the benefits coming from the
exposure to different points of views can be dramatically reduced [34]. Individuals,
and the groups that they form, may move to a more extreme point in the same di-
rection indicated by their own preexisting beliefs; indeed, when people discuss with
many like-minded others, their views become more extreme [46]. First evidences of
social contagion and misperception induced by social groups emerged in the famous
experiment conducted by Solomon Asch in 1955 [7]. The task of the participants
was very simple: they had to match a certain line placed on a white card with the
corresponding one (i.e., having the same length) among three other lines placed on
another white card. The subject was one of the eight people taking part to the test,
but was unaware that the others were there as part of the research. The experiment
consisted of three different rounds. In the first two rounds everyone provided the
right (and quite obvious) answer. In the third round some group members matched
the reference line to the shorter or longer one on the second card, introducing the
so-called unexpected disturbance [28]. Normally subjects erred less than 1% of the
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time; but in the third case they erred 36.8% of the time [4]. Another relevant study
was conducted by James Stoner, who identified the so-called risky shift [45]. In the
experiment people were first asked to study twelve different problems and provide
their solution; after that, they had to take a final decision together, as a group. Out
of thirteen groups, twelve repeatedly showed a pattern towards greater risk-taking.
Misinformation, as well of rumor spreading, deals with these and several other
aspects of social dynamics. However, adoption and contagion are often illustrated
under the oversimplified metaphor of the virus: ideas spread by “contact” and peo-
ple “infected” become active spreaders in the contagion process. We believe that
such a metaphor is misleading, unless we consider that the receptor of such a virus
is complex and articulated. Indeed, the adoption of ideas and behaviors deals with
a multitude of cognitive dimensions, such as intentionality, trust, social norms, and
confirmation bias. Hence, simplistic models adapted from mathematical epidemi-
ology are not enough to understand social contagion. It is crucial to focus on such
relevant research questions by using methods and applying tools that go beyond
the pure, descriptive statistics of big data. In our view, such a challenge can be ad-
dressed by implementing a cross-methodological, interdisciplinary approach which
takes advantage of both the question-framing capabilities of social sciences and the
experimental and quantitative tools of hard sciences.
2 Outline
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 3 we provide the background of our
research work, as well as tools and methodology adopted; in section 4 we describe
the datasets; in section 5 we discuss the dynamics behind information consumption
and the existence of echo chambers on both the Italian and the US Facebook; in sec-
tion 6 we show how confirmation bias dominates information spreading; in section
7 we focus on users’ interaction with paradoxical and satyrical information (trolls),
while in section 8 we analyze users’ response to debunking attempts. In section 9 we
target the emotional dynamics inside and across echo chambers. Finally, we draw
our conclusions in section 10.
3 Background and Research Methodology
In 2009 a paper on Science [33] proclaims the birth of the Computational Social
Science (CSS), an emerging research field aiming at studying massive social phe-
nomena quantitatively, by means of a multidisciplinary approach based on Com-
puter Science, Statistics, and Social Sciences. Since CSS benefits from the large
availability of data from online social networks, it is attracting researchers in ever-
increasing numbers as it allows for the study of mass social dynamics at an un-
precedented level of resolution. Recent studies have pointed out several important
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results ranging from social contagion [48, 36, 6] up to information diffusion [2, 8],
passing through the virality of false claims [15, 21]. A wide literature branch is also
devoted to understanding the spread of rumors and behaviors by focusing on struc-
tural properties of social networks to determine the way in which news spread in
social networks, what makes messages go viral, and what are the characteristics of
users who help spread such information [15, 21, 13, 48]. Several works investigated
how social media can shape and influence the public sphere [1, 9, 17, 18], and ef-
forts to contrast misinformation spreading range from algorithmic-based solutions
up to tailored communication strategies [5, 16, 25, 42, 43, 44].
Along this path, important issues have been raised around the emergence of the
echo chambers, enclosed systems where users are exposed only to information co-
herent with their own system of beliefs [47]. Many argue that such a phenomenon is
directly related to the algorithms used to rank contents [40]. Speaking of this, Face-
book research scientists quantified exactly how much individuals can be exposed to
ideologically diverse news and information on social media [9], finding that individ-
ual’s choice about contents has an effect stronger than that of Facebook’s News Feed
algorithm in limiting the exposure to cross-cutting content. Undoubtedly, selective
exposure to specific contents facilitates the aggregation of users in echo chambers,
wherein external and contradicting versions are ignored [30]. Moreover, the lack of
experts mediating the production and diffusion of content may encourage specula-
tions, rumors, and mistrust, especially on complex issues. Pages about conspiracy
theories, chem-trails, reptilians, or the link between vaccines and autism, proliferate
on social networks, promoting alternative narratives often in contrast to mainstream
content. Thus, misinformation online is pervasive and difficult to correct. To face the
issue, several algorithmic-driven solutions have been proposed both by Google and
Facebook [20, 23], that joined other major corporations to provide solutions to the
problem and try to guide users through the digital information ecosystem [27]. Si-
multaneously, it has also been observed the rapid spread of blogs and pages devoted
to debunk false claims, namely debunkers.
Moreover, the diffusion of unreliable content may lead to confuse unverified sto-
ries with their satirical counterparts. Indeed, it has been noticed the proliferation of
satirical, wacky imitations of conspiracy theses. In this regard, there is a large com-
munity of people, known as trolls, behind the creation of Facebook pages aimed
at diffusing caricatural and paradoxical contents mimicking conspiracy news. Their
activities range from controversial comments and satirical posts, to the fabrication
of purely fictitious statements, heavily unrealistic and sarcastic. According to Poe’s
law [3], without a blatant display of humor, it is impossible to create a parody of ex-
tremism or fundamentalism that someone won’t mistake for the real thing. Hence,
trolls are often accepted as realistic sources of information and, sometimes, their
memes become viral and are used as evidence in online debates from real political
activists. As an example, we report one of the most popular memes in Italy:
Italian Senate voted and accepted (257 in favor, 165 abstained) a law proposed by Senator
Cirenga aimed at providing politicians with a 134 Billion fund to help them find a job in
case of defeat in the next political competition.
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It would be easy to verify that the text contains at least three false statements: i)
Senator Cirenga does not exist and has never been elected in the Italian Parliament,
ii) the total number of votes is higher than the maximum possible number of voters,
and iii) the amount of the fund corresponds to more than 10% of Italian GDP. Indeed,
the bill is false and such a meme was created by a troll page. Nonetheless, on the
wave of public discontent against Italian policy-makers, it quickly became viral,
obtaining about 35K shares in less than one month. Nowadays, it is still one of the
most popular arguments used by protesters manifesting all over Italian cities.
Such a scenario makes crucial the quantitative understanding of the social deter-
minants related to content selection, news consumption, and beliefs formation and
revision. In this essay, we focus on a collection of works [10, 11, 12, 19, 50, 51] aim-
ing at characterizing the role of confirmation bias in viral processes online. We want
to investigate the cognitive determinants behind misinformation and rumor spread-
ing by accounting for users’ behavior on different and specific narratives. In particu-
lar, we define the domain of our analysis by identifying two well-distinct narratives:
a)conspiracy and b) scientific information sources. Notice that we do not focus on
the quality or the truth value of information, but rather on its verifiability. While pro-
ducers of scientific information as well as data, methods, and outcomes are readily
identifiable and available, the origins of conspiracy theories are often unknown and
their content is strongly disengaged from mainstream society and sharply divergent
from recommended practices.
Thus, we first analyze users’ interaction with Facebook pages belonging to such
distinct narratives on a time span of five years (2010-2014), in both the Italian and
the US context. Then, we measure users’ response to i) information consistent with
one’s narrative, ii) troll contents, and iii) dissenting information e.g., debunking
attempts.
4 Datasets
We identify two main categories of pages: conspiracy news – i.e. pages promot-
ing contents neglected by mainstream media – and science news. The first category
includes all pages diffusing conspiracy information (i.e., pages that disseminate con-
troversial information, most often lacking supporting evidence and sometimes con-
tradictory of the official news). Pages like I don’t trust the government, Awakening
America, or Awakened Citizen promote heterogeneous contents ranging from aliens,
chem-trails, geocentrism, up to the causal relation between vaccinations and homo-
sexuality. The second category is that of scientific dissemination and includes insti-
tutions, organizations, scientific press having the main mission to diffuse scientific
knowledge. For example, pages like Science, Science Daily, and Nature are active
in diffusing posts about the most recent scientific advances. Finally, we identify two
additional categories of pages:
1. Troll: sarcastic, paradoxical messages mocking conspiracy thinking (for the
Italian dataset);
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2. Debunking: information aiming at correcting false conspiracy theories and un-
truthful rumors circulating online (for the US dataset).
To produce our datasets, we built a large atlas of Facebook public pages with the
assistance of several groups (Skepti Forum, Skeptical spectacles, Butac, Protesi di
Complotto), which helped in labelling and sorting both conspiracy and scientific
sources. To validate the list, all pages have then been manually checked by looking
at their self-description and the type of promoted content. The exact breakdowns of
the Italian and US Facebook datasets are reported in Table 1 and Table 2, respec-
tively. The entire data collection process is performed exclusively by means of the
Facebook Graph API [24], which is publicly available and can be used through one’s
personal Facebook user account. We used only public available data (users with pri-
vacy restrictions are not included in our dataset). Data was downloaded from public
Facebook pages that are public entities. Users’ content contributing to such entities
is also public unless users’ privacy settings specify otherwise and in that case it
is not available to us. When allowed by users’ privacy specifications, we accessed
public personal information. However, in our study we used fully anonymized and
aggregated data. We abided by the terms, conditions, and privacy policies of Face-
book.
Table 1 Breakdown of the Italian Facebook dataset.
Science Conspiracy Troll
Pages 34 39 2
Posts 62,705 208,591 4,709
Likes 2,505,399 6,659,382 40,341
Comments 180,918 836,591 58,686
Likers 332,357 864,047 15,209
Commenters 53,438 226,534 43,102
Table 2 Breakdown of the US Facebook dataset.
Science Conspiracy Debunking
Pages 83 330 66
Posts 262,815 369,420 47,780
Likes 453,966,494 145,388,117 3,986,922
Comments 22,093,692 8,304,644 429,204
Likers 39,854,663 19,386,131 702,122
Commenters 7,223,473 3,166,726 118,996
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5 Echo Chambers
5.1 Attention Patterns
We start our discussion by analyzing how information gets consumed by users in
both the Italian [10, 11, 12] and the US Facebook [50]. As a first step, we focus on
users’ actions allowed by Facebook’s interaction paradigm i.e., likes, comments, and
shares. Each action has a particular meaning [22]: while a like represents a positive
feedback to the post, a share expresses the desire to increase the visibility of a given
information; finally, a comment is the way in which the debate takes form around the
topic of the post. Also, we consider the lifetime of a post (respectively, a user) i.e.,
the temporal distance between the first and last comment to the post (respectively,
of the user). We also define the persistence of a post (respectively, a user) as the
Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions by accounting for the lifetime of the
post (respectively, the user).
Fig. 1 shows the empirical Complementary Cumulative Distribution Functions
(CCDFs) of users’ activity on posts grouped by category on the Italian Facebook.
We may notice that distributions of likes, comments, and shares are all heavy-tailed.
To further investigate users’ consumption patterns, in Fig. 2 we also plot the CCDF
of the posts’ lifetime, observing that distinct kinds of contents show a comparable
lifetime.
Fig. 1 ITALIAN FACEBOOK. Empirical complementary cumulative distribution functions
(CCDFs) of users’ activity (likes, comments and shares) on posts grouped by category. Distri-
butions denote heavy-tailed consumption patterns.
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Fig. 2 ITALIAN FACEBOOK.
Empirical CCDF, grouped by
category, of the posts’ lifetime
i.e., the temporal distance
(in hours) between the first
and last comment. Lifetime is
similar for both categories.
As for the US Facebook, the distribution of the number of likes, comments, and
shares on posts belonging to both scientific and conspiracy news is shown in the
left panel of Fig. 3. As seen from the plots, all distributions are heavy-tailed – i.e,
they are best fitted by power laws and possess similar scaling parameters. In the
right panel of Fig. 3, we plot the Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions of
posts grouped by category. To further characterize differences between the survival
functions, we perform the Peto & Peto [41] test to detect whether there is a statis-
tically significant difference between the two survival functions. Since we obtain a
p-value of 0.944, we can state that there are not significant statistical differences be-
tween posts’ survival functions on both science and conspiracy news. Thus, posts’
persistence in the two categories is similar also in the US case.
Summarizing, our findings show that distinct kinds of information (science, con-
spiracy) are consumed in a comparable way. However, when considering the corre-
lation between couples of actions, we find that users of conspiracy pages are more
prone to both share and like a post, denoting a higher level of commitment [10].
Conspiracy users are more willing to contribute to a wide diffusion of their topics
of interest, according to their belief that such information is intentionally neglected
by mainstream media.
5.2 Polarization
We now want to understand if users’ engagement with a specific kind of content can
become a good proxy to detect groups of users sharing the same system of beliefs
i.e., echo chambers. Assume that a user u has performed x and y likes (comments)
on scientific and conspiracy posts, respectively, and let ρ(u) = (y−x)/(y+x). Thus,
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Fig. 3 US FACEBOOK Left: Complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) of the
number of likes, comments, and shares received by posts belonging to conspiracy (top) and sci-
entific (bottom) news. Right: Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions of posts belonging to
conspiracy and scientific news. Error bars are on the order of the size of the symbols.
we say that user u is polarized towards science if ρ(u)≤−0.95, while she is towards
conspiracy if ρ(u)≥ 0.95 user u is polarized towards conspiracy.
In Fig. 4 we show the Probability Density Function (PDF) of users’ polarization
on the Italian Facebook. We observe a sharply peaked bimodal distribution where
the vast majority of users is polarized either towards science (ρ(u)∼ 1) or conspir-
acy (ρ(u) ∼ −1). Hence, most of likers can be divided into two groups of users,
those polarized towards science and those polarized towards conspiracy news.
Let us consider now the fraction of friends y of a user u sharing the same po-
larization of u. We define the engagement θ(u) of a user u as her liking activity
normalized with respect to the total number of likes in our dataset. We find that the
more a user is active on her narrative, the more she is surrounded by friends sharing
the same attitude. Such a pattern is shown in the right panels of Fig.4. Hence, so-
cial interactions of Facebook users are driven by homophily: users not only tend to
be very polarized, but they also tend to be linked to users with similar preferences.
Indeed, in both right panels of Figure 4 we can observe that for polarized users the
fraction of friends with the same polarization is very high (& 0.75) and grows with
the engagement.
Similar patterns can be observed on the US Facebook. In Fig 5 we show that
the PDF for the polarization of all users is sharply bimodal here as well, with most
having (ρ(u)∼−1) or (ρ(u)∼ 1). Thus, most users may be divided into two main
groups, those polarized towards science and those polarized towards conspiracy.
The same pattern holds if we look at polarization based on comments rather than on
likes.
In summary, our results confirm the existence of echo chambers on both the Ital-
ian and the US Facebook. Indeed, contents related to distinct narratives aggregate
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Fig. 4 ITALIAN FACEBOOK Left: Probability density function (PDF) of users’ polarization. Notice
the strong bimodality of the distribution, with two sharp peaks localized at −1 . ρ(u) . −0.95
(conspiracy users) and at 0.95. ρ(u). 1 (science users). Right: Fraction of polarized neighbors
as a function of the engagement θ for both science (left) and conspiracy (right) users.
Fig. 5 US FACEBOOK Probability Density Functions (PDFs) of the polarization of all users com-
puted both on likes (left) and comments (right).
users into distinct, polarized communities, where users interact with like-minded
people sharing their own system of beliefs.
6 Information Spreading and Cascades
In this section we show how confirmation bias dominates viral processes of infor-
mation diffusion and that the size of the (mis)information cascades may be approxi-
mated by the size of the echo chamber [19]. We begin our analysis by characterizing
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the statistical signature of cascades according to the narrative (science or conspir-
acy). Fig. 6 shows the PDF of the cascade lifetime for both science and conspiracy.
We compute the lifetime as the time (in hours) elapsed between the first and the
last share of the post. In both categories we find a first peak at approximately 1–
2 hours and a second peak at approximately 20 hours, denoting that the temporal
sharing patterns are similar, independently of the narrative. We also find that a sig-
nificant percentage of the information spreads rapidly (24.42% of the science news
and 20.76% of the conspiracy rumors diffuse in less than two hours, and 39.45%
of science news and 40.78% of conspiracy theories in less than five hours). Only
26.82% of the diffusion of science news and 17.79% of conspiracy lasts more than
one day.
Fig. 6 ITALIAN FACEBOOK
Probability Density Function
(PDF) of lifetime computed
on science news and con-
spiracy theories, where the
lifetime is here computed
as the temporal distance (in
hours) between the first and
last share of a post. Both
categories show a similar be-
havior, with a peak in the first
two hours and another around
20 hours.
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0 10 20 30 40 50
Lifetime(hours)
PD
F Science
Conspiracy
In Fig. 7 we show the lifetime as a function of the cascade’s size, i.e. the num-
ber of users sharing the post. For science news we observe a peak in the lifetime
corresponding to a cascade’s size value of ≈ 200; moreover, the variability of the
lifetime grows with the cascades’ sizes, and higher cascade’s size values correspond
to high lifetime variability. For conspiracy-related contents, lifetime variability in-
creases with cascade’s size, and for highest values we observe a variability of the
lifetime 50% around the average values. Such results suggest that news assimilation
differs according to the categories. Science information is usually assimilated (i.e.,
it reaches a higher level of diffusion) quickly. A longer lifetime does not necessar-
ily correspond to a higher level of interest, but possibly to a prolonged discussion
within a specialised group of experts. Conversely, conspiracy rumors are assimilated
more slowly and show a positive relation between lifetime and size; long-lived posts
tend to be discussed by larger communities.
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Fig. 7 ITALIAN FACEBOOK Lifetime as a function of the cascade’s size for conspiracy news (left)
and science news (right). We observe a contents-driven differentiation in the sharing patterns. For
conspiracy the lifetime grows with the size, while for science news there is a peak in the lifetime
around a value of the size equal to 200, and a higher variability in the lifetime for larger cascades.
Finally, Fig. 8 shows that the majority of links between consecutively sharing
users is homogeneous, i.e. both users share the same polarization and, hence, belong
to the same echo chamber. In particular, the average edge homogeneity value of all
the observed sharing cascades is always greater than or equal to zero, suggesting
that information spreading occurs mainly inside homogeneous clusters in which all
users share the same polarization. Thus, contents tend to circulate only inside the
echo chambers.
Summarizing, we found that cascades’ dynamics differ, although consumption
patterns on science and conspiracy pages are similar. Indeed, selective exposure
is the primary driver of contents’ diffusion and generates the formation of echo
chambers, each with its own cascades’ dynamics.
7 Response to Paradoxical Information
We have showed that users tend to aggregate around preferred contents shaping
well-separated and polarized communities. Our hypothesis is that users’ exposure
to unsubstantiated claims may affect their selection criteria and increase their atti-
tude to interact with false information. Thus, in this section we want to test how
polarized users interact with information that is deliberately false i.e., troll posts,
which are paradoxical imitations of conspiracy contents [10]. Such posts diffuse
clearly dubious claims, such as the undisclosed news that infinite energy has been
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Fig. 8 ITALIAN FACEBOOK
Mean edge homogeneity for
science (solid orange) and
conspiracy (dashed blue)
news. The mean value of edge
homogeneity on the whole
sharing cascades is always
greater or equal to zero.
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finally discovered, or that a new lamp made of actinides (e.g. plutonium and ura-
nium) will finally solve the lack of energy with less impact on the environment, or
that chemical analysis reveal that chem-trails contain sildenafil citratum (sold as the
brand name Viagra).
Fig. 9 shows how polarized users of both categories interact with troll posts in
terms of comments and likes on the Italian Facebook. Our findings show that users
usually exposed to conspiracy claims are more likely to jump the credulity barrier:
indeed, conspiracy users are more active in both liking and commenting troll posts.
Thus, even when information is deliberately false and framed with a satirical pur-
pose, its conformity with the conspiracy narrative transforms it into credible content
for members of the conspiracy echo chamber. Evidently, confirmation bias plays a
crucial role in content selection.
Fig. 9 ITALIAN FACEBOOK
Percentage of comments and
likes on troll posts from users
polarized towards science
(light blue) and conspiracy
(orange).
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8 Response to Dissenting Information
Debunking pages on Facebook strive to contrast misinformation spreading by pro-
viding fact-checked information to specific topics. However, if confirmation bias
plays a pivotal role in selection criteria, then debunking is likely to sound to con-
spiracy users such as information dissenting from their preferred narrative. In this
section, our aim is to study and analyze users’ behavior w.r.t. debunking contents on
the US Facebook [50].
As a first step, we show how debunking posts get liked and commented according
to users’ polarization. Fig. 10 shows how users’ activity is distributed on debunking
posts: left (respectively, right) panel shows the proportions of likes (respectively,
comments) left by users polarized towards science, users polarized towards conspir-
acy, and not polarized users. We notice that the majority of both likes and comments
is left by users polarized towards science (respectively, 66,95% and 52,12%), while
only a small minority is made by users polarized towards conspiracy (respectively,
6,54% and 3,88%). Indeed, the first interesting result is that the biggest consumer of
debunking information is the scientific echo chamber. Out of 9,790,906 polarized
conspiracy users, just 117,736 interacted with debunking posts – i.e., commented a
debunking post at least once.
Fig. 10 US FACEBOOK Pro-
portions of likes (left) and
comments (right) left by users
polarized towards science,
users polarized towards con-
spiracy, and not polarized
users.
Hence, debunking posts remain mainly confined within the scientific echo cham-
ber and only few users usually exposed to unsubstantiated claims actively interact
with the corrections. Dissenting information is mainly ignored. However, in our sce-
nario few users belonging to the conspiracy echo chamber do interact with debunk-
ing information. We now wonder about the effect of such an interaction. Therefore,
we perform a comparative analysis between users’ behavior before and after they
first comment on a debunking post. Fig. 11 shows the liking and commenting rates
– i.e, the average number of likes (or comments) on conspiracy posts per day – be-
fore and after the first interaction with debunking. We can observe that users’ liking
and commenting rates increase after the interaction, Thus, their activity in the con-
spiracy echo chamber is reinforced. In practice, debunking attempts are acting as a
backfire effect.
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Fig. 11 US FACEBOOK Rate
– i.e., average number, over
time, of likes (left) and com-
ments (right)) on conspiracy
posts of users who interacted
with debunking posts.
9 Emotional Dynamics
In this section, we aim at analyzing the emotional dynamics inside and across echo
chambers. In particular, we apply sentiment analysis techniques to the comments
of our Facebook Italian dataset, and study the aggregated sentiment with respect to
scientific and conspiracy-like information [51]. The sentiment analysis is based on a
supervised machine learning approach, where we first annotate a substantial sample
of comments, and then build a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classification model.
The model is then applied to associate each comment with one sentiment value:
negative, neutral, or positive. The sentiment is intended to express the emotional
attitude of Facebook users when posting comments.
To further investigate the dynamics behind users’ polarization, we now study
how the sentiment changes w.r.t. users’ engagement in their own echo chamber. In
the left panel of Fig. 12, we show the PDF of the mean sentiment of polarized users
with at least two comments. We may observe an overall negativity, more evident on
the conspiracy side. When looking at the sentiment as a function of the number of
comments of the user, we find that the more active a polarized user is, the more she
tends towards negative values, both on science and conspiracy posts. Such results are
shown in the right panel of Fig. 12, where the sentiment has been regressed w.r.t. the
logarithm of the number of comments. Interestingly, the sentiment of science users
decreases faster than that of conspiracy users.
We now want to investigate the emotional dynamics when such polarized (and
negative-minded) users meet together. To this aim, we pick all the posts represent-
ing the arena where the debate between science and conspiracy users takes place. In
particular, we select all the posts commented at least once by both a user polarized
on science and a user polarized on conspiracy. We find 7,751 such posts (out of
315,567), reinforcing the fact that the two communities are strictly separated and
do not often interact with one another. Then, we analyze how the sentiment changes
when the number of comments of the post increases i.e., when the discussion be-
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Fig. 12 ITALIAN FACEBOOK Left: Probability Density Function (PDF) of the mean sentiment of
polarized users having commented at least twice, where −1 corresponds to negative sentiment,
0 to neutral and 1 to positive. Right:Average sentiment of polarized users as a function of their
number of comments. Negative (respectively, neutral, positive) sentiment is denoted by red (re-
spectively, yellow, blue) color. The sentiment has been regressed w.r.t. the logarithm of the number
of comments.
comes longer. Fig. 13 shows the aggregated sentiment of such posts as a function
of their number of comments. Clearly, as the number of comments increases – i.e.,
the discussion becomes longer – the sentiment is always more negative. Therefore,
we may conclude that the length of the discussion does affect the negativity of the
sentiment.
Fig. 13 US FACEBOOK Ag-
gregated sentiment of posts
as a function of their number
of comments. Negative (re-
spectively, neutral, positive)
sentiment is denoted by red
(respectively, yellow, blue)
color.
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10 Conclusions
We investigated how information related to two very distinct narratives – i.e., scien-
tific and conspiracy news – gets consumed and shapes communities on Facebook.
For both the Italian and the US scenario, we showed the emergence of two well-
separated and polarized groups – i.e., echo chambers – where users interact with
like-minded people sharing the same system of beliefs. We found that users are ex-
tremely focused and self-contained on their specific narrative. Such a highly polar-
ized structure facilitates the reinforcement and contents’ selection by confirmation
bias. Moreover, we observed that social interactions of Facebook users are driven
by homophily: users not only tend to be very polarized, but they also tend to be
linked to users with similar preferences. According to our results, confirmation bias
dominates viral processes of information diffusion. Also, we found that the size of
misinformation cascades may be approximated by the same size of the echo cham-
ber.
Furthermore, by measuring the response to the injection of false information
(parodistic imitations of alternative stories), we observed that users prominently
interacting with alternative information sources – i.e. more exposed to unsubstan-
tiated claims – are more prone to interact with intentional and parodistic false
claims. Thus, our findings suggest that conspiracy users are more likely to jump
the credulity barrier: even when information is deliberately false and framed with
a satirical purpose, its conformity with the conspiracy narrative transforms it into
credible content for members of the conspiracy echo chamber.
Then, we investigated users’ response to dissenting information. By analyzing
the effectiveness of debunking on conspiracy users on the US Facebook, we found
that scientific echo chamber is the biggest consumer of debunking posts. Indeed,
only few users usually active in the conspiracy echo chamber interact with debunk-
ing information and, in the latter case, their activity in the conspiracy echo chamber
increases after the interaction, rather than decreasing. Thus, debunking attempts are
acting as a backfire effect.
Finally, we focused on the emotional dynamics inside and between the two echo
chambers, finding that the sentiment of users on science and conspiracy pages tends
to be negative, and is more and more negative when the discussion becomes longer
or users’ activity on the social network increase. In particular, the discussion degen-
erates when the two polarized communities interact with one another.
Our findings provide insights about the determinants of polarization and the evo-
lution of core narratives on online debating, suggesting that fact-checking is not
working as expected. As long as there are no immediate solutions to functional
illiteracy, information overload and confirmation bias will continue dominating so-
cial dynamics online. In such a context, misinformation risk and its consequences
will remain significant. To contrast misinformation spreading, we need to smooth
polarization. To this aim, understanding how core narratives behind different echo
chambers evolve is crucial and could allow to design more efficient communica-
tion strategies that account for users’ cognitive determinants behind these kind of
mechanisms.
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